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THE CLOUD AND THE DEEP SEA: HOW CLOUD 
STORAGE RAISES THE STAKES FOR UNDERSEA 
CABLE SECURITY AND LIABILITY 
Lixian Loong Hantover* 
[T]he Internet is many things, in many places.  But one thing it most 
certainly is, nearly everywhere, is, in fact, a series of tubes.  There are 
tubes that connect London and New York.  Tubes that connect Google 
and Facebook.  There are buildings filled with tubes, and hundreds of 
thousands of miles of road and railroad tracks, beside which lie buried 
tubes.  Everything you do online travels through a tube.  Inside those 
tubes (by and large) are glass fibers.  Inside those fibers is light.  
Encoded in that light is, increasingly, us.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our data is moving into the cloud.  While in the past we stored data 
on the computers on our desks, now we increasingly give control of our 
data to far-away professionals and give up our hard drives for storage 
online in the “cloud.”2  A PEW report in 2008 found that sixty-nine 
percent of Americans had either stored files online or used a web-based 
software application at least once.3  Now over one exabyte, or over one 
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 1. ANDREW BLUM, TUBES: A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE INTERNET 5-6 (2012).  
Blum writes this in response to Senator Ted Stevens’ famous quote that the Internet is 
just a series of tubes.  Id. at 5.  
 2. Id. at 230.  The cloud refers to any storage on the Internet, but it is hardly 
cloudlike.  Id.  Data is in fact being stored on massive data centers.  Id. 
 3. Janna Q. Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud Computing, PEW INTERNET 
& AM. LIFE PROJECT 8 (Jun. 11, 2010), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/The-future-
of-cloud-computing.aspx.  This figure does not include popular cloud services like 
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billion gigabytes, of data is stored among the many cloud services like 
Gmail and Dropbox.4  Amazon’s S3 cloud storage service, which 
provides the cloud storage space for companies like Dropbox,5 stores 762 
billion objects.6  That is enough for 108 objects per person on earth.7  In 
2013, the cloud market is predicted to grow by 18.5 percent.8  By 2016, it 
is estimated that users will store more than one third of their digital 
content in the cloud.9  
It is not just individuals accessing their documents via Dropbox that 
make up this migration to the cloud.  Companies looking to save on 
expensive hardware and the salaries of the IT professionals required to 
maintain that expensive hardware are also looking toward the cloud for 
their own data storage.10  Because individuals and businesses 
increasingly rely on the cloud to perform basic functions, reliable access 
to that cloud is not merely important – it is critical.  The concerns about 
                                                                                                  
Dropbox which launched in 2008 and has been accumulating users ever since.  See Jason 
Kincaid, Dropbox Acquires The Domain Everyone Thought It Had: Dropbox.com, TECH 
CRUNCH (Oct. 13, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/10/13/dropbox-acquires-the-
domain-everyone-thought-it-had-dropbox-com/. 
 4. John Callaham, Over One Exabyte of Data is Now Stored in the Cloud, NEOWIN 
(Feb. 20, 2013, 02:45), http://www.neowin.net/news/research-firm-over-1-exabyte-of-
data-is-now-stored-in-the-cloud.  To put this amount of data in perspective, Eric Schmidt, 
the former CEO of Google estimated that the total of all human knowledge created from 
the dawn of man until 2003 amounted to five exabytes.  James Bamford, The Black Box, 
WIRED (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/05/ 
features/the-black-box?page=all. 
 5. Where Does Dropbox Store Everyone’s Data?, DROPBOX, 
https://www.dropbox.com/help/7/en (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). 
 6. Rich Miller, Amazon: 762 Billion Objects Stored on S3 Cloud, DATA CENTER 
KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2012/01/31/ 
amazon-762-billion-objects-stored-on-s3-cloud/.  In this article, the cloud refers to both 
cloud services like Google, which are considered Saas (Software as a service) and cloud 
services like Amazon or Rackspace, which are considered Iaas (Infrastructure as a 
service). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Brandon Butler, Gartner: Public Cloud Market to Grow 18.5% this Year, 
NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2013/022813-
gartner-public-cloud-267223.html.  
 9. Gartner Says That Consumers Will Store More Than a Third of Their Digital 
Content in the Cloud by 2016, GARTNER (June 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/-id/2060215. 
 10. Joseph A. Schoorl, Comment, Clicking the “Export” Button: Cloud Data Storage 
and U.S. Dual-Use Export Controls, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 634-5 (2012); Pete 
Eppele, Six Reasons to Move to the Cloud, WIRED (Oct 4, 2012, 1:55 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2012/10/move-to-cloud-consider-saas/.  
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cloud storage are thus two-fold: the security of the data itself11 and the 
security of our access to that data.12   
This article focuses on the latter concern.  Specifically, this article 
focuses on the security of one critical component of the global Internet 
infrastructure that we use to access the cloud: undersea cables.  These 
cables once carried only transatlantic telegraph messages.  Now they 
carry any kind of communication – telephone calls, emails, bank account 
transfers – across the globe.13  Accessing files from the cloud is just one 
of the many ways we rely on this infrastructure.   
As cloud storage grows and multinational companies begin to rely on 
these cables to access their files, the potential economic impact of a 
breach of these cables becomes catastrophic.  This article argues that the 
growth in cloud storage has raised the stakes when it comes to undersea 
cable security by making our ability to access our day-to-day files 
dependent on them.  Furthermore, it is unclear who, if anyone, would be 
responsible for the economic loss associated with a loss of access to 
those files.   
Part II of this article explores the idea of cloud storage and how 
access to information in the cloud has become a global issue that relies 
on undersea cables.  It examines the structural flaws in undersea cable 
security and the inability of the current legal system to compensate 
victims for the loss of access to data in the event of a breach of undersea 
cable security.  Part III explores and critiques various solutions to ensure 
that access to data in the cloud remains safe from undersea cable 
breaches and that any economic loss due to cable breaches can be 
compensated.  This article then advocates in Part IV for a solution that 
includes a shift of liability to cloud storage providers and increased 
redundancy requirements. 
                                            
 11. John Villasenor, Addressing Export Control in the Age of Cloud Computing, 
BROOKINGS 1 (July 25, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/07/25-
cloud-computing-villasenor. 
 12. See Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 637 (2011) 
(explaining the importance of access to information).  
 13. See PROTECTIVE SEC. DIVISION, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CHARACTERISTICS AND 
COMMON VULNERABILITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY: CABLE LANDING STATIONS 7 
(Draft - Jan. 15, 2004) available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-UCL-CV.pdf; 
BLUM, supra note 1, at 6.  Stephen Malphus, the chief of staff to Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernake was quoted as saying that when communications networks go 
down, the financial sector does not merely grind to a halt, it snaps to a halt.  MICHAEL 
MATIS, THE PROTECTION OF UNDERSEA CABLES: A GLOBAL SECURITY THREAT 1 (U.S. 
Army War College 2012), available at www.hsdl.org/?view&-did=718794. 
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II. UNDERSEA CABLES TODAY: USE, SECURITY, AND  
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES 
A. Why the Cloud (and the Global Economy) Needs Undersea Cables 
These days, the answer to the question “where is my data” is no 
longer simple.  In the past, the answer would have been “on my 
computer,” “on this disk,” or “on my server in my office.”  Now 
companies and consumers are moving their data to the cloud: a vast 
network of servers that can be accessed anywhere there is an Internet 
connection.14  For users, the cloud enables them to be a few clicks away 
from their data no matter what computer they are using.  If a user’s 
computer breaks or becomes infected, the data in the cloud is insulated 
and can just be accessed from a different computer.15  Put simply, your 
data is in on a separate server, which you can access from any Internet 
connected device.  While the user, be it an individual or a company, 
might be in Los Angeles, the server with their data could be anywhere 
from Wyoming to Singapore.16   
So if your files are on a server in Singapore and you are living in Los 
Angeles, how do you access these servers all around the world?17  If 
asked, many of us might think that our communications are carried 
mostly over the air via satellite.  Therefore, many of us may assume that 
we access the cloud via satellite connections – literally in the “clouds.”  
But this is not the case.18  In fact, it is estimated that satellites only have 
the capacity to carry seven percent of the total Internet traffic to and from 
                                            
 14. Schoorl, supra note 10, at 635; see also Jonathan Strickland, How Cloud Storage 
Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloud-
storage1.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2013, 5:55 PM). 
 15. Schoorl, supra note 10, at 634. 
 16. For example, Google has servers in Singapore, Finland and Taiwan. Data Centers, 
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations/ (last visited Dec. 4, 
2012). 
 17. This article does not suggest that all access to data stored in the cloud utilizes 
undersea cables.  If your data is stored in the same country or city that you are in, it is 
likely that no undersea cables will be used to access your data.   
 18. Douglas R. Burnett, Cable Vision, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 2011, at 
67 [hereinafter Burnett, Cable Vision].  See also Jon Brodkin, Bandwidth Explosion: As 
Internet Use Soars, Can Bottlenecks be Averted?, ARS TECHNICA (May 1, 2012, 9:40 
AM),  http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/05/bandwidth-explosion-as-internet-use-
soars-can-bottlenecks-be-averted/.   
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the United States.19  Instead, it is the global undersea cable network that 
is the “fundamental medium of the global village.”20 
 
 
Fig. 1.1. Reprinted from Bobbie Johnson, How One Clumsy Ship Cut Off the Web for 75 
Million People, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 1, 2008, at 22.  
 
This undersea cable network, illustrated in Figure 1.1, is made up of 
over two hundred submarine cables that crisscross the ocean floor,21 
carrying millions of messages and facilitating over one trillion dollars in 
daily transactions. 22  The longest cable, called the “Southern Cross” 
                                            
 19. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67. 
 20. BLUM, supra note 1, at 193.  See also Sebastian Anthony, The Secret World of 
Submarine Cables, EXTREME TECH (Sept. 21, 2011, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.extremetech.com/computing/96827-the-secret-world-of-submarine-cables   
(“Across these cables, which span distances of up to 13,00o [sic] km (8,000 miles) and 
have total lengths over 21,000 km (13,000 miles), terabits of information squirt from one 
side of the planet to another. To get from London to Tokyo, your packets can traverse 
Europe, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and finally 
the South China Sea — or they can hop across the Atlantic, the entirety of continental 
North America, and then long haul over the Pacific.”).     
 21. John Brandon, Protecting the Submarine Cables That Wire Our World, POPULAR 
MECHANICS (Mar. 15, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/ 
engineering/-infrastructure/protecting-the-submarine-calbes-that-wire-our-world- 
15220942?click=pm_latest. 
 22. MATIS, supra note 13, at 1. 
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stretches over 18,500 miles across the Pacific Ocean.23  In addition, 
twelve more lines are scheduled for construction in 2013, which will 
connect more countries than ever before, including the small island 
nation of Tonga.24  In the United States, just thirty-six cables carry more 
than ninety-five percent of all international voice, data and video 
communications.25  Thus, the global communications system depends 
heavily on undersea cables, regardless of cloud storage.26  
With the rise of cloud storage, our need to access international 
servers has increased our reliance on this global undersea cable 
infrastructure.27  In general, undersea cables carry our data to servers to 
be stored, and subsequently carry requested data back from the servers to 
us. 28  If cables were severed between a user in Country A and a server on 
which the user’s data was stored in Country B, the user would be unable 
to access their data.29  Our access to the cloud and cloud storage currently 
relies on undersea cables.30   
This is not to say that if one cable connecting Country A to Country 
B is cut, all Internet traffic between the two countries will cease.  A 
single cut to a submarine cable “typically has little impact [on Internet 
traffic because] the communications may be rerouted through alternative 
                                            
 23. Brandon, supra note 21. “In 2004 alone, approximately $7.4 trillion [was] traded 
on cables transmitted between 208 countries [on a daily basis].” MATIS, supra note 13, at 
1. 
 24. Brandon, supra note 21.  
 25. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67.  See also MATIS, supra note 13, at 9 
(stating that “[i]f the exact location[s] of the [thirty-six] cables in the [United States] were 
identified, a successful [terrorist] attack on a few of those locations could affect roughly 
[ninety-five] percent” of Internet traffic on the East Coast). 
 26. Bamford, supra note 4, at 83. This dependence on undersea cables will only 
increase because global Internet traffic is estimated to reach 966 exabytes per year by 
2015. Id.  Many of the security risks and subsequent liability issues discussed in this 
article apply just as readily to other services that rely on undersea cable infrastructure.  
This article focuses on access to data in the cloud but acknowledges that disruptions to 
other cloud-reliant services could be equally catastrophic.  For example, given the 
reliance of the financial industry on these cables to transfer billions of dollars per day, a 
large-scale disruption could cripple the industry.  
 27. See, e.g., SEACOM Upgrades Submarine Network Capacity to Turbo-Boost 
African Internet, SEACOM (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.seacom.mu/news/article-
124/seacom-upgrades-submarine-network-capacity-to-turbo-boost-african-internet/ 
(noting that the rise in cloud computing has been cited as a reason to upgrade undersea 
cables).  
 28. See Brandon, supra note 21.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
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cables.”31  Countries like the United States, for example, are connected to 
the outside world by multiple cables.32   
As the amount of cable disruptions increases (i.e., more cables are 
cut), on the other hand, the amount of data traffic that is lost increases 
exponentially.33  For example, an analysis was done of possible 
disruptions of the cable lines connecting Europe and India.34  It found 
that although “India is fairly resilient in the case of one or two cable 
disruptions,” nearly seventy percent of traffic to and from India would be 
lost with just three concurrent cable disruptions.35  Actual data exists that 
supports similar predictions.36  In 2006, an earthquake along the coast of 
Taiwan triggered undersea landslides and broke nine undersea cables.37  
This event had repercussions extending beyond the country of Taiwan.38  
Internet telecommunications linking Southeast Asia were seriously 
impaired.39  More than six hundred gigabits of capacity went offline, and 
trading of the Korean won temporarily stopped.40  Even a week after the 
quake, an Internet provider in Hong Kong publicly apologized for 
continued slow Internet speeds.41  
If companies and users continue to move their data into the cloud, 
and therefore continue to rely more on undersea cables to access the 
cloud for their day-to-day needs, we must consider two key problems.  
First, we must consider structural issues, which concern potential 
                                            
 31. John K. Crain, Assessing Resilience in the Global Cable Infrastructure 13 (Jun. 
2012) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with the Naval 
Postgraduate School), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA562772; but see Tom 
Parfitt, Georgian Woman Cuts off Web Access to Whole of Armenia, THE GUARDIAN, 
(Apr. 6, 2011, 15:12)  http://m.guardiannews.com/world/2011/apr/06/georgian-woman-
cuts-web-access (a 75 year old woman in Georgia cut one terrestrial cable with her shovel 
and accidentally cut off the Internet for the entire country of Armenia).  
 32. That being said, all but one of the U.S. transatlantic cables lands within the same 
thirty-mile radius on the east coast of the United States.  Limited access to landing 
stations in the United States has created chokepoints for cables, increasing the 
vulnerability of the system as a whole.   MATIS, supra note 13, at 7.  
 33. Crain, supra note 31.  
 34. Id. at 35.  
 35. Id. at 41.  It is important to note that these disruptions did not even have to occur 
in Indian waters; some of the more devastating scenarios involved breaches off the coast 
of France.  Id. at 47.  
 36. Id. at 9. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. BLUM, supra note 1, at 200. 
 41. Id. 
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disruptions to the undersea cable infrastructure.  Second, we must 
recognize liability issues, which relate to the fallout of large-scale 
disruptions.  Who will compensate parties for the ever-increasing 
potential economic damages?  How do we protect companies and users 
from the economic impact undersea cable disruptions will have on them?   
The security concerns about undersea cable disruptions are by no 
means new.  In World War II, for example, undersea cable operators in 
Porthcurno, England installed flamethrowers on beaches and took other 
precautions to protect cable stations against Nazi sabotage.42   
Likewise, the question of who will pay for damage caused by cable 
disruptions is not a new concern and has been litigated extensively.43  
The stakes, however, have changed because cables no longer concern 
only communication.  Now financial markets and multi-billion dollar 
businesses rely on the efficiency and strength of the undersea cable 
infrastructure.44  Individuals and entities rely on cables not only to 
communicate or transfer funds, but also to access their day-to-day files.45  
As a result, the adoption of cloud storage has drastically increased the 
potential economic fallout of a major cable disruption.  The rise of cloud 
storage has not created the problem of undersea cable security and 
liability; it has simply made these problems critical. 
                                            
 42. Id. at 203-205; see also Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 69.  In fact cable 
cutting as a tactic of war spans all the way back to the Spanish American War when the 
United States cut the cables linking Spain to its colonies.  BLUM, supra note 1, at 200.  
Similarly, the first offensive action taken by the British Navy during World War I was to 
cut off Germany’s links to the rest of the world by severing its undersea cables.  Id. 
 43. See, e.g., AT & T Corp v. Tyco Telecomms., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (confirming an arbitration award requiring the owner of a vessel that 
severed a submarine underwater transatlantic telecommunications cable to compensate 
the owners of the cable for damages incurred in repairing the cable and restoring affected 
traffic by rerouting it across other networks while repairs were being completed); 
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 287 U.S. 170, 177 (1932) (libel in 
admiralty).    
 44. The financial sector would not suffer from the effects of a cable breach in 
isolation.  Industries enmeshed in the global economy through the Internet also include 
shipping, airlines and manufacturing.  Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67; see 
also MATIS, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that “[w]hen a cable loses service, it has a 
definite, but difficult impact [on] the global financial sector”). The International Cable 
Protection Committee (ICPC) legal advisor estimates that interruptions of underwater 
fiber optics communications systems have a financial impact in excess of one and a half 
million dollars per hour.  MATIS, supra note 13, at 3. 
 45. Id.  
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B. Structural Vulnerability of Undersea Cables:  
Breaks are Likely to Occur 
The previous section discussed how merely a few simultaneous 
breaches of undersea cables could cause huge disruptions in data traffic 
and therefore have huge ramifications for businesses relying on those 
cables.  But how likely is it that simultaneous disruptions will actually 
occur?  Are the cables themselves safe?  Structurally, undersea cables are 
extremely vulnerable and therefore disruptions are likely.  Despite the 
huge amounts of data traffic that flow through these cables, each one is 
merely the size of a garden hose.46  In water depths of less than fifteen 
hundred meters, cables are buried in yard-deep trenches beneath the 
ocean floor and armored with a steel sheath.47  This helps to protect 
against the most common kind of undersea cable disruption: accidental 
breakage by trawl fishing and ship anchors.48  In water depths in excess 
of fifteen hundred meters, however, where breakages from anchors are 
unlikely, cables are laid on the ocean floor and are otherwise 
unprotected.49  Even with these precautions, there are an average of two 
hundred cable faults50 worldwide each year.51  
Although the majority of these faults are caused unintentionally by 
anchors, fishing equipment, and occasionally sharks,52 terrorism and 
piracy are genuine concerns.53  The location of cables along the ocean 
floor is made readily available to mariners, commercial bottom 
fishermen, and undersea seabed developers so that they do not 
accidentally damage the cables.54  Anyone who wishes to tamper with the 
cables by cutting or using explosives55 could easily access their location 
via the Internet.56   
                                            
 46. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67. 
 47. MATIS, supra note 13, at 8. 
 48. Of the roughly two hundred submarine fiber-optic cable faults worldwide every 
year, up to seventy-seven percent are caused by anchors and fishing gear. Burnett, Cable 
Vision, supra note 18, at 67. 
 49. Id. 
 50. In this article, the terms “fault,” “breach,” and “disruption” are used 
interchangeably. 
 51. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67. 
 52. Id.; see also Sudmike, Shark Attack on Subcable, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ex7uTQf4bQ.  
 53. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67. 
 54. MATIS, supra note 13, at 2. 
 55. Id. at 13. 
 56. Id. at 2. 
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Undersea cable expert Douglas R. Burnett argues that “it is naïve to 
assume that submarine-cable landing stations, cables, the cable ships, and 
the marine depots that maintain the systems will escape asymmetric 
terrorist acts,”57 and recent cases have proven that Burnett’s concern is 
not unfounded.  In 2007, “piracy was blamed in the theft of active 
submarine cables and equipment” off the coast of Vietnam.58  “In early 
2008, over the course of just a few days, multiple cables were cut off the 
coasts of Egypt and Dubai,” causing at least fourteen countries to lose a 
significant amount of data traffic.59  The “Maldives was entirely 
disconnected from the rest of the world.”60  The short time span and close 
proximity of these cuts raised suspicions of a deliberate attack.61  Most 
recently, in June 2010, terrorists in the Philippines struck an international 
cable.62  The public location of the cables and their lack of sophisticated 
armor or protection make them incredibly vulnerable to intentional 
attacks.  
A further concern is the security of cable landing stations.  These 
stations are the “dry” component of the undersea cable infrastructure that 
connects the undersea cables to domestic terrestrial cable infrastructure.63  
The landing stations are above ground and highly visible and thus are 
vulnerable to attack.64  These attacks need not be as sophisticated as 
attacks on undersea cables.  For example, cars with explosives could be 
parked close to a landing station.65  While damage to cable stations can 
be more easily repaired than breaches that occur in the deep sea, these 
cable landing stations often serve multiple undersea cables.66  As a result, 
a successful attack on one cable landing station can simultaneously 
disrupt multiple cables.67  
                                            
 57. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 69. 
 58. Crain, supra note 31, at 9. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.; but see Bobbie Johnson, How One Clumsy Ship Cut Off the Web for 75 
Million People, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2008), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/feb/01/internationalpersonalfinancebusiness.i
nternet (reporting that the cut was initially thought to have been the result of a boating 
accident).  
 62. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 69. 
 63. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 13, at 3-6. 
 64. Id. at 7. 
 65. Id. at 9 (listing many security vulnerabilities of cable landing stations).  
 66. See id. at 7. 
 67. See SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORKS, http://submarinenetworks.com/stations/north-
america (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) (listing U.S. cable stations and the undersea cables 
that they serve).  The U.S. satellite system contains similar “earth stations” that house 
2013] The Cloud and the Deep Sea 11 
 
C. Governments Are Not Taking Adequate Measures to Protect Undersea 
Cables and Deter Attackers 
Perhaps even more troubling than the above-mentioned structural 
vulnerability of undersea cables is the lack of security efforts and 
criminal sanctions by governments to protect undersea cables and deter 
future attacks.68  U.S. National Intelligence director James Clapper 
recently testified that cyber attacks, (by which he meant purely digital 
attacks like computer worms or viruses that can shut down the electrical 
grid or financial markets),69 are the nation’s number one security 
priority.70  Clapper highlighted how much governments, utilities, and 
financial services rely on the Internet and therefore are vulnerable to 
cyber attack.71  Yet at the same time, protection of undersea cables (a 
critical infrastructure that supports the Internet) from physical attacks is 
sorely lacking.  For example, in the United States, the willful destruction 
of an international submarine cable is punishable by a maximum of two 
years in prison and a mere $5,000 fine.72  This fine is hardly a deterrent, 
and is far out of proportion to the damage that such an act would cause.  
Furthermore, the United States has not joined the 162 countries that have 
signed onto the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).73  As a result, there are no UNCLOS security protections for 
                                                                                                  
numerous receivers, Bamford, supra note 4, at 83, and are thus vulnerable to the same 
kinds of attacks as cable landing stations.  For example, one of AT & T’s powerful earth 
stations, located in Roaring Creek, Pennsylvania, houses three 105-foot dishes that handle 
much of the U.S. communications to and from Europe and the Middle East.  Id.  Another 
AT & T earth station in California contains three dishes that service the Pacific Rim and 
Asia.  Id.  An attack on one of these stations could significantly disrupt satellite 
communication.  While this article does not discuss the U.S. satellite system and its 
security in detail, it is definitely worth further study. 
 68. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 68.  
 69. A cyber-attack is usually thought of as a completely digital attack that utilizes a 
computer network or system to carry out the attack.  Cyberattack, TECHOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.techopedia.com/definition/24748/cyberattack (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).  
However, Oona Hathaway and her co-authors have advocated for a definition of “cyber 
attack,” which focuses on the ends (attacking cyber systems).  Oona A. Hathaway et al., 
The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 826-27 (2012).   A bombing of an 
undersea cable meant to disrupt the Internet would fall under Hathaway’s definition of 
cyber-attack because its intended effect is to disrupt the cyber system.  See id.  
 70. Matt Vasilogambros, America’s 3 Biggest Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, NAT’L J. 
(Mar. 13, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/america-s-3-
biggest-cybersecurity-vunerabilities-20130313. 
 71. Id.  
 72. 47 U.S.C.A. § 21 (2006); Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 68. 
 73. Id. at 69. 
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U.S. undersea cables outside of U.S. waters.74  Only Australia and 
Singapore have created a single point of contact within their 
governments to address issues of undersea cable security and to 
coordinate with cable owners to combat hostile actions.75  On a 
worldwide level, no organization is responsible for undersea cables and 
there have been no international tests of cable defense systems.76  The 
maintenance and security of the cables is left to private trade 
organizations.77  Given the extent to which governments themselves rely 
on these cables,78 the current lack of a coherent undersea cable security 
strategy by governments must be remedied.  The infrastructure itself is 
vulnerable, and governments like the United States are not yet taking 
adequate actions to protect it.  It is not enough for governments like the 
United States to focus on digital attacks on Internet systems.  They must 
also take action to protect the physical structure of the Internet.79 
D. Who Pays for the Damages Resulting from  
Undersea Cable Disruptions? 
The second issue surrounding undersea cables is the question of 
liability.  In the event that a breach of an undersea cable does occur, who 
pays for the damage?  In 1998, the privately owned TAT-10 undersea 
cable than runs across the Atlantic Ocean was severed by a ship operated 
                                            
 74. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 69. 
 75. Id. at 70. 
 76. MATIS, supra note 13, at 10. 
 77. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67-69. 
 78. MATIS, supra note 13, at 10 (explaining that the Department of Defense’s net-
centric warfare and global information grid rely on undersea cables and that breaches to 
these cables would risk the capabilities of modern U.S. warfare).   
 79. The Obama administration recently released an executive order on cybersecurity.  
Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).  Part of the order focused on 
the need to develop a framework to gather and share intelligence on risks to privately  
owned critical infrastructure.  Id.  This is a step forward in that it indicates awareness that 
there is a lack of protection of critical infrastructure.  However, it is unclear what this 
intelligence framework would entail and how much the government would be involved  
in the physical protection of Internet infrastructure.  See id.; see also Roland L. Trope & 
Stephen J. Humes, By Executive Order: Delivery of Cyber Intelligence Imparts Cyber 
Responsib i l i t ies ,  IEEE SEC.  & PR I V AC Y (Mar . /Apr .  2013),  avai lable a t  
http://www.hklaw.com/files/Publication/ab69bb14-30d2-41f0-bcab-5ae08947a7ab/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5226c0f7-8993-48a0-9c40-6262cef78e27/ 
By%20Executive%20Order%20%28final%20submission%20draft%29.pdf (analyzing the 
implications of the executive order for infrastructure providers). 
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by Tyco, Inc.80  Tyco was ordered to pay the owners of TAT-10 over five 
million dollars in damages.81  This amount included not only costs 
incurred in repairing the damaged cable but also the costs incurred by the 
owners of TAT-10 when they had to re-route the traffic via rival-owned 
undersea and terrestrial cable lines.82  This scenario, in which one party 
negligently severs a cable belonging to another party, is the typical case 
addressing damages to undersea cables after they occur.  In these cases, 
both in the United States and internationally, the party that causes the 
breach is liable to the cable owner for the costs of repair and 
replacement.83  For example, in the United States, cable owners recover 
based on the law of torts.84  The doctrine of trespass to chattel (in this 
case, the cable) enables a cable owner to recover for loss of use based on 
difference in value or cost of repair.85  In cases like AT & T v. Tyco, this 
measure of damages has been interpreted to include the costs of rerouting 
traffic to other cables. 86  On average, the cost of a single repair is one to 
three million dollars plus. 87  Costs vary based on factors such as the 
distance between the breach and the repair ship, weather, coastal state 
permitting requirements, and the engineering skills of the crew.88   
Not included in these cases are economic damages to third parties 
who are unable to conduct business when cable lines go down, whether 
they be individual consumers or multinational companies.  These cases 
merely involve the cable owner and the tortfeasor who damages the 
cable.  The question remains whether third party consumers who rely on 
the cloud have a cause of action against either the party who causes the 
cable fault or the cable owners themselves for losses that they incur from 
not being able to access their data.89  
What would this potential claim look like?  In most cases of 
undersea cable breaches, which are due to anchors or trawl fishing, a 
                                            
 80. AT & T Corp. v. Tyco Telecomms., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 294, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003).  
 81. Id. at 298. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Douglas R. Burnett, Recovery of Cable Repair Ship Cost Damages From Third 
Parties That Injure Submarine Cables, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 103, 122 (2010) [hereinafter 
Burnett, Recovery]. 
 84. See id. at 112. 
 85. Id.  
 86. AT & T Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 302. 
 87. Burnett, Recovery, supra note 83, at 108. 
 88. Id. at 108-109. 
 89. Note that this section and other sections in this article that have to do with issues 
of ex-post liability are focused on U.S. law only.  However, many of the ideas could 
potentially be applicable in other countries as well.  
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tortfeasor’s negligence leads to the cutting of one cable.90  Cable 
operators are typically prepared for this and have created re-routing 
agreements whereby one cable company agrees to carry the traffic of its 
competitor should the competitor’s cable sustain damage and vice 
versa.91  As a result, the dangers of severe economic damage to third 
parties are slim in these cases.  On the other hand, a natural disaster or 
pirate or terrorist attack that disables several cables simultaneously could 
lead to loss of access to data, as both the original cable and the re-routing 
cable would potentially be severed.  Repairs often take up to one to two 
weeks to complete.92  As a result, companies and users could lose access 
to their data for a prolonged period of time and could incur huge amounts 
of financial losses.93  These users would look to the legal system to 
recover for the economic damage they had suffered.  Unfortunately, it is 
unlikely that the current legal framework offers them much recourse. 
Firstly, who would these users sue to recover?  In the case of natural 
disasters, there is no tortfeasor from whom to recover.  In the case of 
pirates or terrorists there are issues of sovereignty,94 and even if there 
were not, these tortfeasors would probably not have the means to 
compensate victims.  The only feasible claim is against the owner of the 
cables themselves, which would in turn be backed by insurers.  Users 
would want to bring actions under tort law against cable companies (who 
would hopefully have adequate insurance) for negligence in failing to 
take precautions against foreseeable attacks and disasters.95  
Unfortunately for these consumers, the majority rule in tort actions is 
that damages for “economic loss” are not recoverable on a negligence 
claim when the economic damages are not accompanied by property 
                                            
 90. See Burnett, Recovery, supra note 83, at 104. 
 91. AT & T Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 297. 
 92. MATIS, supra note 13, at 6. 
 93. These damages could range from lesser amounts for a small business that is 
unable to operate for a day to huge amounts for businesses like financial institutions that 
can handle trillions of dollars and millions of transactions each day.  See, e.g., Burnett, 
Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67. 
 94. Id. at 68 (discussing how prosecuting pirates has proven difficult because of these 
issues). 
 95. It is not that these terrorist attacks are not foreseeable.  The vulnerability of the 
undersea infrastructure and increased frequency of attacks makes a simultaneous attack 
on the cable infrastructure if not probable, at least foreseeable.  However, from a broader 
policy perspective, it is unclear whether we would want consumers to be able to bring 
actions against cable companies.  If companies knew they were potentially on the hook 
for billions of dollars in damage they would likely be unable to obtain insurance and may 
choose to exit the market entirely.  
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damage.96  Exceptions to the economic loss rule cover cases involving 
physical injury or malpractice suits against lawyers and accountants, but 
do not apply to this situation.97  In the case of undersea cable disruptions, 
users have not themselves incurred any physical damage.  They have 
only lost revenue due to the loss of access to their data.  As a result, it is 
unlikely a court would allow recovery for these economic damages in 
claims of negligence against cable owners.  Consumers relying on cloud 
storage may find themselves unprotected from losses of data due to 
undersea cable damage. 
It is possible, however, that contract law could provide some 
recourse in situations where the consumer and the cable operator are in 
contract with one another.  In cases governed by contract law, damages 
are controlled by terms in the contract.98  In recent years, cloud based 
service providers have themselves become owners of undersea cable 
infrastructure.99  Facebook recently joined a consortium building a new 
                                            
 96. ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS § 3.6 (6th ed. 2005). 
Future scholarship may want to begin to broach the topic of when information becomes 
property or if the loss of access to data can ever be considered a property loss.  However, 
this article assumes that for now at least, a loss of access to data is not damage to 
property. 
 97. Id. at § 3.8.  Even if a court did allow companies to recover from cable owners, 
there would still be the issue of whether the economic loss in question was too tenuously 
removed from the damage to the cable.  In Kinsman Transit Company v. City of Buffalo, 
a ship belonging to the Kinsman Transit Company became unmoored and crashed into 
and destroyed a bridge.  Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 822 (2d 
Cir. 1968).  The two plaintiffs in the case brought suit against the transit company and the 
city of Buffalo to recover for economic loss.  Id. at 824.  Plaintiff A brought suit because 
as a result of the bridge being unavailable, it was unable to transport its wheat and had to 
purchase replacement wheat to fulfill a contract.  Id. at 823.  Plaintiff B sought to recover 
the costs of equipment it was forced to rent to unload its cargo from a ship that was 
blocked by ice due to the accident.  Id.  The court in both cases found that the damage to 
the plaintiffs was too ‘remote’ or ‘indirect’ a consequence of the defendants' negligence 
and denied their requests for recovery.  Id. at 824.  It is likely in the case of cable damage 
and subsequent loss of data that the economic damage would be considered even more 
tenuous.   
 98. DAVID W. TOLLEN, THE TECH CONTRACTS HANDBOOK 108 (2010).  Tollen gives a 
good and relevant example to illustrate how this works:  “Imagine the provider supplies 
defective software.  The software malfunctions, and as a result, the recipient loses a 
million dollars.  Imagine also that the limitation of liability clause caps the provider’s 
liability at $50,000.  The result:  the provider is liable for one twentieth of the recipient’s 
loss.  Even if everyone agrees the malfunction was the provider’s fault, the provider owes 
$50K, and that’s all.”  Id. 
 99. Robert McMillan, Facebook Mimics Google with Underwater Cable to Asia, 
WIRED (Jul. 5, 2012), http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/facebook-submarine/. 
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undersea cable in Asia.100  In doing so, it follows in the footsteps of 
Google which helped pay for an undersea cable connecting Japan to the 
United States.101  Thus it is possible, depending on the contract terms, 
that consumers could recover from cloud providers who are also cable 
owners (like Google) that they are in contract with, if the cable breach 
leads to downtime in the cloud data storage service.  However, here the 
largest obstacle is the contract itself.  Consumers who use Google Docs 
to store their work documents must sign an agreement that absolves 
Google of any liability for economic harm to the consumer.102  This 
provision would likely absolve Google of having to pay a consumer for 
the loss they experience should a cable be breached.103  The only 
exception would be if a court found the contract to be unconscionable or 
opposed to public policy.104  But this would be unlikely to occur.105  In 
contracts, as in torts, it is unlikely that a user would be able to recover for 
economic harms suffered even if those harms rose into the billions of 
dollars.  
III. HOW TO PROTECT VULNERABLE INFRASTRUCTURE AND  
PROVIDE RECOURSE FOR CABLE BREAKS: POSSIBLE BUT  
PROBLEMATIC SOLUTIONS 
Part II demonstrated not only that the physical infrastructure of 
undersea cables is vulnerable to intentional disruptions, but also how 
difficult it would be for those affected by a disruption to recover for any 
economic loss they experience as a result of losing access to their data.  
With cloud computing on the rise, it has never been more critical to 
ensure the safety of the world’s undersea cables.  Should a breakage 
occur, cloud computing customers will need to have some recourse to 
recover for their economic loss.  This Part explores and critiques possible 
                                            
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Andrew Couts, Upload at Your Own Risk: Most Cloud Storage Services Offer No 
Data Guarantee, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/ 
computing/upload-at-your-own-risk-most-cloud-storage-services-offer-no-data-guarantee/. 
 103. Id. 
 104. TOLLEN, supra note 98, at 111. 
 105. See generally Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism –
The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 1-5 (2012) 
(discussing how the area of unconscionability in boilerplate contracts is evolving).  
However, it is hard to imagine judges voiding contracts and thus opening up companies 
to huge amounts of liability, especially when the user is a company that could have stored 
its data elsewhere. 
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but problematic solutions to the structural and liability issues raised in 
the previous sections.  Part IV then advocates for a proposal 
incorporating data redundancy, government subsidized insurance, and 
shifted liability aimed specifically at safeguarding access to the cloud.  
Possible Solution A: Increase Security and International Preparedness 
Most of the solutions that have been put forward by scholars focus 
on the structural security issues alone and what governments must do to 
secure this vital infrastructure.  Douglas Burnett argues that governments 
should follow the lead of Australia and Singapore and coordinate a single 
point of contact for undersea cable issues.106  He suggests that the U.S. 
Navy should reach out to naval allies such as Canada and France as well 
as to cable industry representatives and together develop cable-protection 
strategies that enable the navy to respond quickly to pirate and terrorist 
attacks.107  Commander Michael Matis of the U.S. Navy recommends 
creating a new international cable construction regulatory regime that 
would promote greater international cooperation and information 
sharing.108  As part of that effort, he urges the United States to 
immediately ratify UNCLOS and encourages UNCLOS members to 
collectively update their legislation to protect cables and make it an 
international crime to tamper with them.109  These scholars understand 
that any action to increase the safety of undersea cables must be 
international.  Models have shown that a cable break off the coasts of 
Marseille could have detrimental effects on data flow in and out of 
India.110  In other words, merely increasing security in one’s own waters 
will not be sufficient.  Any security strategy must be global in scope.  
Even if both of the above plans are implemented, however, this will 
likely still not solve the problem of structural security.  Autonomous 
undersea vehicles are now commercially available and can easily dive to 
the depths where undersea cables are left unprotected and render them 
inoperable by cutting them or laying explosives.111  Unlike in aviation, 
undersea vehicles are very hard to find due to low light underwater and 
                                            
 106. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 70-71. 
 107. Id. 
 108. MATIS, supra note 13, at 18. 
 109. Id. at 15-18. 
 110. Crain, supra note 31, at 46-47.   
 111. See MATIS, supra note 13, at 12; Laurence R. Wrathall, Comment, The 
Vulnerability of Subsea Infrastructure to Underwater Attack: Legal Shortcomings and the 
Way Forward, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 223, 237-38 (2010). 
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thus low visibility.112  Radars can scan thousands of square miles of air 
space but there is no equivalent system underwater.113  Even with 
unprecedented cooperation amongst naval forces, it is virtually 
impossible to completely police the thousands of miles of undersea cable 
infrastructure.114  Therefore, while a ratification of UNCLOS or 
increased international cooperation will likely be helpful and increase 
global preparedness, it will not be enough to prevent many attacks. 
Possible Solution B: Keep All Data Within a Country 
One solution is to simply do away with the need for undersea cables 
altogether when it comes to data storage in the cloud.  Some cloud 
storage providers such as Google have allowed customers to pay a 
premium and specify where their data is to be kept.115  In Google’s 
contract with the City of Los Angeles, Google guaranteed that the city’s 
data would remain within the contiguous forty-eight states.116  While this 
solution does eliminate the reliance on undersea cables for data storage, 
it is problematic.  Firstly, the ability of customers to choose where their 
data is stored may not be available to smaller customers with limited 
bargaining power.117  More importantly, in today’s global economy, 
having data servers limited to the United States is unrealistic.  Many 
companies, large and small, have customers or offices all around the 
world.  No matter where their data servers are located, undersea cables 
will have to be relied upon because some customers will not be located 
in the same country as the data server.  Having data stored in servers in 
every country where a company operates or has customers rather than in 
several strategic servers in a few countries is economically inefficient.  
While this solution may work for some customers like the City of Los 
Angeles, it is not a viable solution for most.   
                                            
 112. Wrathall, supra note 111, at 234. 
 113. Id. at 234-35.  Wrathall explains that underwater concealment maximizes the 
impact that a small number of operatives can have, allowing them to place explosives in 
multiple locations over an extended time frame and later conduct a coordinated 
simultaneous strike.  Id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Schoorl, supra note 10, at 636. 
 116. Patrick Thibodeau, Microsoft’s Cloud-Enabled Office 2010 Set to Join Battle with 
Google, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/s/ 
article/9175019/Microsoft_s_cloud_enabled_Office_2010_set_to_join_battle_with_Goog
le. 
 117. Schoorl, supra note 10, at 637. 
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Possible Solution C: Creation of a Fund for Data Disruption Victims or 
a Subsidized Insurance Plan 
Part II explained that the current U.S. legal framework is unlikely to 
provide recourse for cloud computing users in the event that there is a 
breach of undersea cables and they lose access to their data.  As we rely 
more and more on undersea cables to form the backbone of our 
businesses and economy, the amount of possible economic losses that 
users could face begins to reach catastrophic levels.  Often in cases of 
catastrophes, like floods, the BP oil spill and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, a fund is created whereby parties who have suffered a 
loss due to the event can recover, even if their damages are purely 
economic in nature.  For example, the BP oil spill was the worst oil spill 
in U.S. history.118  The spill had a huge effect not only on the wildlife in 
the Gulf of Mexico and local fishermen, but on the communities 
surrounding the gulf as well.  In New Orleans, there was a twenty-eight 
percent drop in tourism even though the city was 150 miles away from 
the spill.119  The economic effects of the oil spill rippled far beyond the 
accident site.  As a result, BP created a fund of over twenty billion 
dollars to compensate those affected.120  The fund allowed claimants to 
recover for purely economic damages.121  In this case, it was BP, the 
negligent party, who contributed to the huge recovery fund.  
In the case of the BP oil spill, the tortfeasor had immense funds at its 
disposal and was easily identifiable as the responsible party.  BP caused 
the spill and BP provided the funds to compensate the victims.122  In 
situations involving natural disasters or terrorist attacks, however, it is 
often the government, the insurer, or if all else fails, the victim, who 
                                            
 118. See Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound:  The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as 
a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims--A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 819 
(2011).  
 119. Allan Kaner et al., Mass Torts Litigation Forum:  The Deepwater Horizon Gulf 
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 121. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, NATIONAL POLLUTION FUNDS, OIL SPILL CLAIMS 
CENTER, http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/claims/#types_of_claims (last visited Dec. 3, 2012) (a 
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bears the burden of the catastrophe.123  The larger and more frequent the 
catastrophe, the more likely that private insurance companies will refuse 
to offer insurance to cover it.124  Thus if the government does not step in, 
victims are left on the hook for any damage.  Sometimes this takes the 
shape of a fund like the BP oil spill fund, except that the funds are 
provided by the government.  In the case of the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund, the funds were provided by the government (and 
therefore U.S. taxpayers).125  Other times, government aid for victims 
comes in the form of insurance.  Before 1968, property owners were 
forced to assume the risk of flood damage.126  Flooding was considered 
so high-risk that private insurance companies refused to cover flood 
damage.127  In this case, instead of creating a fund that would dole out 
money for individual claims, the government enacted the National Flood 
Insurance Act, which subsidized insurance plans managed by private 
insurers.128  Property owners were required to purchase insurance ex-
ante, unlike in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, where no 
ex-ante action was necessary for recovery.129    
It is possible that users who suffer economic loss due to an undersea 
cable breach could recover either via a fund like the BP fund or through a 
subsidized insurance program like the National Flood Insurance Act.  
Neither solution would be perfect.  In the case of a fund, who would pay 
for the potentially enormous damages?  Is the situation of a massive 
undersea cable breach more akin to an oil spill where the cable owner 
(and any of their insurers) would be held responsible for contributing to 
the fund, or would the government be responsible as it was for the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund?  In the case of a terrorist or 
pirate attack on undersea cables, the responsible terrorists and pirates are 
obviously at fault, and so one would think the government should be 
responsible for any compensation payouts just as in the September 11th 
Fund.  On the other hand, it could be argued that the cable companies 
were negligent in not taking adequate precautions to secure their cables 
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against such outside attacks and in failing to provide sufficient alternate 
cables.130  So perhaps the cable companies should be at least partially 
responsible for the funds.   
The problem with requiring cable companies to pay a large part of a 
recovery fund is the likelihood of breaches – either accidental or from 
deliberate attack.  Undersea cable infrastructure will remain vulnerable 
even with the increased security measures suggested above in Proposal 
A.131  Cable breaches are much more likely to occur than oil spills or 
terrorist attacks.132  Requiring cable companies to pay billions of dollars 
in damages to third parties for an event that is likely not preventable by 
them could bankrupt smaller cable owners.  It could also deter companies 
like Google from becoming cable owners and opening themselves up to 
this kind of liability.  Likewise, it would be hard for these companies to 
find willing insurers to cover this kind of likely liability.   
It is hard to argue, given the initiation of the breakages by terrorists 
or natural disasters, that cable companies should be forced to pay 
damages similar to that of the BP oil spill, which was caused by the 
negligence of BP’s own agents.  As a result, it is most likely that the 
burden would fall on the government if a potential fund were to be 
created.  This would put taxpayers on the hook for a huge bill.  Such 
legislation to compensate victims for attacks that occur halfway around 
the world for damages merely economic in nature may not be perceived 
as fair and thus may not be politically viable.133  Therefore, the ability of 
the government to create this kind of fund is unclear. 
As for insurance, like with flooding, private insurance companies 
may not be willing to insure either users or cable owners, given how 
likely a simultaneous breach is to occur and how catastrophic the 
damages could be.  Thus a government-subsidized model would make 
sense.  In fact, similar models have been suggested for terrorist attacks in 
the past in which the government would handle the extreme range of 
potential liability so that private insurers could offer consumers terrorism 
insurance.134  However, these models have been criticized for being 
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unsustainable.135  With subsidized insurance, policyholders pay 
premiums that represent a mere percentage of the true actuarial risk.136  
Thus the program is designed to be a loss-making program and is 
sustainable only through continued government funding. 137  As a result, 
the popularity and political viability of this plan is also unclear.  Would 
taxpayers support continually subsidizing the economic losses of others 
no matter how large?  How much economic damage would taxpayers be 
willing to shoulder? 
IV. PROPOSED MOVE TOWARD A HOLISTIC SOLUTION: INCREASE 
REDUNDANCY AND SHIFT LIABILITY 
What the above proposed solutions show is that there is no “silver 
bullet” solution to undersea cable security and liability for cable 
breaches.  Merely increasing international cooperation and maritime 
security, for example, will not be sufficient to prevent all attacks.  Nor 
will this increase in security do anything to compensate victims who lose 
access to their data for a prolonged period of time.  Likewise, a solution 
focused entirely on increasing liability does little to improve the physical 
security of the infrastructure itself.  Therefore, any solution going 
forward must be holistic.  It must consider both ex-ante security 
measures and ex-post liability.  This article proposes a solution meant to 
address both of these issues in the context of cloud computing - to ensure 
that access to data remains safe and that victims can recover in the event 
of a data breach.  In doing so, this article draws from scholarship on 
cybersecurity as well as public information on the government-
subsidized insurance programs mentioned above.  It also shifts the focus 
on undersea cable liability away from the cable owner to the cloud data 
storage providers and their insurers.    
While the security of undersea cables is a specific problem having to 
do with a particular piece of telecommunications infrastructure, undersea 
cables are in fact just one part of a larger mesh that makes up the 
Internet.  A potential breach of cables is thus an issue of cybersecurity.  
While many proposals to increase and improve cybersecurity, such as 
building firewalls or repelling hackers,138 are inapplicable to undersea 
                                            
 135. Id. at 599. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 599. 
 138. See generally UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, https://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/-
Recommended_Practices.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2012).  
2013] The Cloud and the Deep Sea 23 
 
cables due to their focus on software, other cybersecurity solutions that 
incorporate infrastructure can be applied.  One solution is the idea of 
redundancy.139  While it may be efficient to have a single point of access 
to one’s data, this approach creates the possibility of losing access to all 
that data if that single point of access is destroyed.140  It is therefore 
better to be redundant and inefficient: having information stored in 
multiple locations and having multiple points of access to that data.141  
Professor Derek Bambauer argues that inefficiency creates resiliency.142  
Bambauer suggests that multiple data storage facilities and modes of 
access can not only improve a user’s chance of being able to access their 
data but can also deter intentional attacks.143  The less chance an attack 
has to actually cause damage through data disruption, the less it will be 
an attractive plan to an attacker.144  It is useful to think of a resilient 
Internet as a hydra.145  Cut off multiple heads and the creature still 
survives because each head is redundant.  Therefore the incentive to cut 
off just a few heads is reduced.  Security is increased not through 
additional patrols or naval exercises but by simply making the target less 
attractive to potential attackers.146   
To increase cybersecurity in general, Bambauer proposes 
establishing information storage legislation that would require an 
organization to maintain separate and redundant information in a way 
that ensures that if it loses its primary source of data, it is able to restore 
regular functionality within a day.147  His proposal involves penalties and 
                                            
 139. See generally Bambauer, supra note 12. 
 140. Bambauer, supra note 12, at 637; see also SYMFORM, REDUNDANT DATA STORAGE, 
http://www.symform.com/join-the-revolution/how-symform-works/data-redundancy/ 
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 141. Bambauer, supra note 12, at 637. 
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 146. An argument can be made that in the case of piracy, increased redundancy will be 
ineffective.  A more redundant system does not remove the attractiveness of a cable if the 
purpose is to sell its components on the black market or for scrap.  See Burnett, Cable 
Vision, supra note 18, at 69.  Also, Bambauer’s proposal assumes terrorists will act 
rationally.   Terrorists may still attack cable infrastructure as a symbolic gesture even if 
the impact on the flow of data is minimal. 
 147. Bambauer, supra note 12, at 645.  Bambauer looks at record keeping rules like the 
Securities and Exchange requirement that accounting firms keep records related to 
auditing and financial statements reviews for seven years after such reviews are 
concluded.  Id.  These existing requirements suggest that private incentives for 
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sanctions for non-compliance as a way to enforce the legislation.148  
There are several issues that Bambauer himself raises about his 
proposal.149  Bambauer acknowledges that establishing these 
requirements through public law is challenging.150  Government 
mandates risk being extremely expensive and poorly tailored, and the 
speed of the legislative process increases the likelihood that mandates 
will become rapidly obsolete.151  However, he argues that despite these 
problems with legislation, relying on the private sector to develop best 
practices may lead to insufficient precautions.152  Bambauer does not 
resolve the specifics of his proposed legislation.  He does not address the 
scope of information that different organizations would be required to 
store redundantly or the level and speed of functionality restoration that 
would avoid triggering penalties.  Although he acknowledges that 
various industries would have to be treated differently,153 he does not 
delve into those differences.    
This article proposes creating a new kind of government-subsidized 
insurance and certification plan, based on the idea of redundancy 
advocated by Bambauer, as a way to protect undersea cables and their 
users.  Briefly, this article proposes that the government offer subsidized 
insurance to cloud data providers who meet certain set redundancy 
requirements.  Those data providers who met the requirements would be 
government certified, and consumers would be encouraged to utilize 
these certified services.  Consumers would be allowed to recover from 
these certified companies, who would be backed by government 
insurance, for economic damages due to loss of data access.  While this 
insurance is envisioned to be available to U.S. consumers, the model 
itself could be followed in other countries. 
Firstly, the U.S. government should work with private cable 
operators154 and data storage providers to create a set of guidelines for 
                                                                                                  
information storage are frequently inadequate, at least in comparison to larger societal 
interest in that information.  Id. at 641. 
 148. Id. at 647-48. 
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 154. By having the government work with private companies, this plan hopes to avoid 
the problems highlighted by Bambauer of either obsolete legislation or insufficient 
precautions. See  Bambauer, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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optimal redundancy.155  This is not simply a matter of determining the 
minimum number of data center locations that a company like Google or 
Amazon must have.  The coalition should look at models of the effects of 
potential undersea cable breaches to determine strategic placements of 
data servers around the world, and to ensure that if a group of cables are 
cut multiple data centers are still accessible.  They should consider 
expanding the use of domestic data centers as well.156  This coalition 
should also look at the larger Internet infrastructure as a whole.  It should 
explore whether new technologies such as long-range WiFi157 could 
reduce reliance on undersea cables by rerouting data in the event of a 
breach.  Both locations and technology should be diversified.  
Once these guidelines are established, compliant companies would 
be eligible to receive government-subsidized data disruption insurance.  
Unlike flood insurance, which puts the burden on consumers to purchase 
ex-ante insurance, the burden would be on the data storage companies 
themselves to pay for the insurance.  Once they had purchased this 
insurance, these companies would be certified as “recommended and 
insured cloud storage providers.”158  Users who chose to use these 
recommended providers would be able to recover for economic loss in 
the event of a cable breach leading to loss of data access.  Government 
funds would be available to insurance companies of certified data 
providers in the event of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other 
catastrophic data disruptions.159  However, more standard data 
disruptions, such as those caused by computer viruses or human error (by 
                                            
 155. A question that would have to be resolved is which executive agency would 
spearhead this effort.  The Federal Communications Commission would be an obvious 
choice, given its regulation of other communications industries like terrestrial cable 
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 156. See supra Part III.B. 
 157. See generally Chris Burns, WiFi 802.22 Technology Promises Wireless Data Over 60 
Miles: Say Goodbye to Data Plans, SLASHGEAR (July 29, 2011), 
http://www.slashgear.com/wifi-802-22-technology-promises-wireless-data-over-60-miles-
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 158. The certification would be subject to ongoing audits.  The standard for adequate 
redundancy is likely to change over time as new technology is developed, and this system 
should be prepared for that.   
 159. This proposal does not intend to change the fact that cable owners must handle all 
repairs, and does not require their insurers to shoulder repair costs in cases of terrorist or 
pirate attacks.  It may be advisable to establish a rule forcing cable owners who do not 
adequately protect their cables to pay fines that would be funneled into the proposed 
insurance fund.   What adequate precautions entail would have to be determined.   
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a data storage provider’s employees), would be covered by the data 
providers and their insurance companies.160  In other words, government 
funds would be available in cases of large-scale disruptions outside of a 
data storage company’s control.161  
Several issues are raised by this particular proposal.  The first issue is 
whether the private sector would be willing to participate in such a plan.  
For private insurance companies, they would be able to offer 
comprehensive data disruption insurance without worrying about being 
liable for billions of dollars in economic losses in the event of a terrorist 
attack or undersea landslide.  Therefore, it is likely that private insurance 
companies would support this proposed arrangement.  However, data 
storage providers would be required to spend a great deal of money on 
increasing their redundancy and would also have to pay insurance fees.  
Furthermore, they would now be liable for the acts of third parties on 
infrastructure like undersea cables that do not even belong to them.  For 
them, it would not seem like an attractive plan.   
But two factors could be emphasized that would make data storage 
provider participation more likely.  First the government would pay for 
the damage caused by third parties.  Second, the hope is that the 
certification would encourage users to utilize certified data storage 
providers as “safer” options.  Consumers who value the security of their 
data and access to that data would likely migrate to these certified 
services.162  In this regard the challenge would be publicizing and raising 
awareness about the certification, such that consumer demand for 
certified data storage makes the certification process sufficiently 
attractive to data storage providers.  
The second issue raised by this article’s proposed holistic solution is 
sustainability.  As discussed above, one of the main criticisms of the 
government-subsidized flood insurance program is that floods continue 
to occur and thus the government has to pay out a never-ending supply of 
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 161. This article does not address whether government insurance would cover 
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funds.163  In the case of data disruption, the insurance would be given out 
only to those companies who met the agreed upon redundancy 
requirements.  As a result, only the most extreme terrorist attacks or 
natural disasters would lead to losses.  A breach of a few cables would be 
covered due to redundancy and users would not experience a loss of 
access to their data.  Therefore, the amount of times the government 
would actually have to pay out money to cover data disruptions would 
likely be limited.  Granted, the payouts in those infrequent cases could be 
costly, potentially reaching into the billions of dollars depending on the 
industries affected.  However, as more technology is developed to create 
new modes of access, such as through long-range WiFi or increased 
satellite capacity, the risks of such catastrophic failure should decrease 
even further. 
Perhaps the largest problem with this proposal is the effect on 
smaller cloud data storage providers who lack the funds to reach the 
required redundancy.  This problem would be especially acute if the 
government decided to go one step further and require that any cloud 
storage provider, no matter how small, would be liable for the economic 
damages of its customers resulting from loss of access to data.  As a 
result, data storage companies would risk having to pay for all potential 
damages unless they complied with the redundancy requirements and 
purchased the subsidized insurance plan.  While this further step by the 
government would increase consumer security, the measure could crush 
smaller data storage providers who are unable to build out sufficient 
infrastructure to comply with the redundancy requirement.  As a result, 
cloud data storage would begin to be consolidated into the hands of 
fewer and more powerful players.164   
This consolidation may not be a bad thing.  By having such stringent 
requirements, the cloud computing system would begin to closely 
resemble a U.S. utility system.  Smaller companies could “interconnect” 
with larger storage providers like Google or Amazon to ensure coverage 
by the government-subsidized insurance.  The larger companies like 
Google would be more heavily regulated but could also benefit from 
greater market share and the interconnection fees from smaller 
companies.  This article does not endorse such a dramatic change, but the 
government should at least consider whether protecting consumers and 
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the economy warrant more extreme measures.   Even under the less 
extreme plan proposed in this article, the government will have to 
consider whether the protection of consumer access to data should be 
placed above the interests of smaller cloud storage providers.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Just as it is impossible to fully prevent cyber-attacks,165 it is 
impossible to prevent attacks on the vast web of undersea cables.  
Retaliation and other reactive measures for these attacks would not do 
anything to remedy the situation.166  As a result, successful cybersecurity, 
including undersea cable security, must focus on ex-ante redundancy.  
This article has proposed a plan to encourage cloud data providers to 
increase redundancy and has also provided a mechanism by which 
consumers could be protected from economic loss stemming from 
disruptions to their data access. 
If this plan were to be implemented, there would likely be a shift of 
consumers toward certified data storage providers.  As a result, more 
consumers would be relying on highly redundant systems to access their 
data.  Terrorists looking to attack Internet infrastructure would find that 
attacking cables would have far less of an effect as the data flowing 
through the disrupted cables would simply be rerouted through alternate 
cables and technologies.  The target would be less attractive and thus 
more secure.  This article argues that the best way to increase the security 
of undersea cables is to rely on them less.  
It is important to remember, however, that the economies of the 
world are increasingly intertwined.  As a result, while this proposal is 
targeted at the U.S. government and legal system, it is imperative that 
other nations also consider not only increasing security of cables in their 
waters, but also providing recourse for their own citizens in the event of 
data disruptions.  If companies in India or China suffer data disruptions 
and lack any recourse or compensation, those effects will be felt 
globally.  If countries protect their consumers from cyber-attacks, 
whether they are attacks on undersea cables or computer viruses, data 
around the world will be safer and the global economy will grow more 
resilient. 
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